

## From clean up to FICAC: Anti-corruption in Fiji's post coup politics

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**Abstract** The leaders of Fiji's 2006 military coup launched a 'cleanup campaign' and set up an Independent Commission Against Corruption. So far it has brought court cases against about 24 people. Among them is the former Prime Minister, who was charged with corruption for his role in institutions designed to promote the economic interests of indigenous Fijians (who constitute about 56% of the population). The article considers what counts as 'corruption' in these Affirmative Action policies: a so-called 'Agriculture Scam', which distributed farm implements free to Fijian farmers; a company called Fijian Holdings, which received concessional finance from the government; and a Native Land Trust Board, which collects rent on behalf of indigenous landowners. It concludes that army and popular opinion in Fiji hold conceptions of corruption that are much broader than the offences set out in the country's penal code, and which the new ICAC is attempting to enforce.

### Introduction

In December 2006, the Fiji army took control of the country for the third time and launched what its commander, Frank Bainimarama, called a 'cleanup campaign'. The army removed Members of Parliament, a layer of senior officials, and heads of statutory bodies and public enterprises. It demanded that institutions investigate suspicions of corruption among their executives. The army set up an office to gather public complaints about official corruption. Soldiers collected files from government departments, and brought suspects into the military barracks for questioning. There were complaints of intimidation, trial by media, and lack of evidence. The army also launched a crackdown on petty crime in during which three people were killed, allegedly beaten up by police and soldiers [27].

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Bainimarama then arranged to be installed as Prime Minister of an Interim Government. He brought in some former politicians—but not those of the former governing party—and a civilian lawyer who became Attorney General. They quickly set up the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) that had been promised, but not delivered, by their elected predecessor [7]. FICAC's case load built up quickly. In November 2007 it had received 1,056 complaints of which 236 were 'officially registered' [30]. By September 2008 the number of complaints had roughly tripled to 3,000, of which 450 were registered. On the output side, FICAC reported it had brought 10 cases to court by February, rising to 17 by April. In June 2008 it announced that a total of 22 public officials and 2 businessmen had been charged [5]. Among those charged was Lisenia Qarase, the former Prime Minister.

Ironically, Qarase had been installed by Bainimarama as Interim Prime Minister after the last coup, in 2000. Then an investment banker, Qarase had gone on to form his own political party, the *Sogosogo Duavata ni Lewenivanua* (SDL), which had won the general elections in 2001 and 2006. Bainimarama had become increasingly disenchanted with the performance of his appointee and admitted that 'we made a hell of a mistake back then' [3]. Bainimarama is an indigenous Fijian, and head of army almost completely staffed by indigenous Fijians, but he was particularly outraged by Qarase's embrace of policies favouring indigenous Fijians—particularly the chiefs—over what he saw as the interests of the nation as a whole. In the 2007 census Fiji's population was 837,271, of which 56% were indigenous Fijian. The second largest ethnic group was Indo-Fijian, descendants of migrants from India during the colonial period, who constituted 37% of the population [6].

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it examines the so-called Agriculture Scam that took place under Qarase's interim government in 2000–2001, and his role in a network of indigenous-only economic institutions, particularly Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL) and the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB). Each led to charges of corruption. Between 2005 and 2008, six Ministry of Agriculture officials were charged over this scam, and five were convicted (the sixth being found not guilty). Between 2007 and 2008, the FICAC brought corruption charges against approximately 22 other officials. Among them was Qarase who was charged with abuse of office over share purchases in FHL and in the transfer of rents held by the NLTB to a new investment company. At the time of writing Qarase's trial has not yet taken place.

The second aim of the article is to analyse the events in terms of legal and other, broader, definitions of corruption. Fiji politics is usually analysed in terms of race, ethnicity, class and nation. Ideas about corruption help us look at it from a new angle. The article relies on local newspaper reports and government documents rather than interviews with the protagonists.

## The agriculture scam

The Agriculture Scam refers to the provision of farm implements, fertilizer, plant materials and other items to indigenous farmers and various middlemen in 2000–2001. Large quantities of public money were involved: two million Fijian dollars in 2000, and 16 million Fijian dollars in 2001 (about \$US 8.6 million in the second year or 42% of the Department of Agriculture's budget). The politicians presiding

over the scheme have occasionally given speeches or statements to defending themselves and the scheme, but so far have escaped formal charges. It has similarities with the National Bank of Fiji scandal a decade earlier [22].

The special audit report in 2002 detailed multiple breaches of the Finance Act by officials involved, from the Permanent Secretary, Peniasi Kunatubu, downwards. Its findings were summarised by political scientist Asinate Mausio [28]:

...unethical practices including the expenditure of \$194,000 on non-farm implements; the purchase of farm implements at greatly inflated prices from the major supplier, Suncourt Hardware Limited; the restriction of supplier options to only two hardware outlets, Suncourt hardware and Repina Wholesalers; the non-issue of tenders to the Government Supplies Department which could have supplied materials at a much cheaper price; and the failure to obtain three competitive quotations before purchasers were made. The largest supplier, Suncourt, netted \$4 million worth of purchases by Local Purchase Orders.

Kunatubu was eventually charged and convicted of abuse of office and breaches of rules and regulations in November 2006. Bainimarama cannot take the credit for this case as it took place before he launched his coup. The Ministry's Principal Accountant and two junior civil servants were convicted of 'official corruption' in September 2008. Pita Alifereti, the owner of Repina Wholesalers, who had supplied some equipment to be distributed to the farmers, and paid kickbacks to the officials, was also convicted. The directors of Suncourt were also charged but at the time of writing the case is bogged down in legal arguments.

### **Fijian holdings limited**

Fijian Holdings is a company set up in 1984 'to accelerate Fijian participation in the economy' [16]. It has shares in companies involved in manufacturing, financial services, construction and tourism. FHL itself has two kinds of shareholding: Type A shares which can be bought, held and sold by Fijian individuals and companies, which have voting rights, and Type B shares, held by a network of Fijian institutions on behalf of their members, including the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) and the Fijian Trust Fund (FTF). The stock exchange describes it as a 'restricted company', as only indigenous Fijians—defined in terms of registration with the *Vola ni Kawa* held by the Native Land Commission—can be shareholders. A little over 10 million A shares and 20 million B shares have been issued and in 2008 the company paid dividends of 20% to the A shareholders and 10% to the B [14]. The FAB and the FTF are shown as each holding 10 million of the company's \$1 shares.

There are two ways in which the FHL has attracted suspicion of corruption: because of a government payment to it and because of the way that senior officials were allotted Class A shares. The FHL began with capital of \$Fijian 1.2 million, boosted by a \$Fijian 20 million payment from the government through the FAB. There has been continuing argument about whether this was—or should be—a loan or a grant. An interview with FHL's Managing Director on the company's website describes it as an 'injection' or 'investment' [17]. In a 2005 article on FHL, journalist Samisoni Pareti refers to a 'free gift' and 'handout' [31]. The 'Blueprint

for the Protection of Fijian and Rotuman rights and interests, and the advancement of their development' that Qarase presented to Fiji's Great Council of Chiefs soon after the coup in 2000 promised to convert this 'interest-free loan' into a grant. It would then be partly distributed to the 14 Fijian provinces or their own provincial holding companies [34].

However the charges against Qarase refer to controversy over how various prominent Fijians, including Qarase himself, acquired those Class A shares. In an interview with the late Lyle Cupit, a founder of FHL, journalist Samisoni Pareti [31] asked about the common complaint that:

Some of the shareholders, including directors and employees of the Fiji Development Bank (FDB), of which Cupit was also a chairman, financed purchases of Class A shares with loans from the FDB. One such investor was the then FDB managing director, Lisenia Qarase. There was criticism that a number of prominent Fijians were given unfair access to the shares in a manner that bordered on 'insider trading.'

The journalist quoted Sitiveni Rabuka describing one of the ways it worked (though Rabuka is hardly a disinterested observer, having authored Fiji's first coup, had set up a rival Fijian investment vehicle, Yasana Holdings):

When they float shares, they usually limit it to a day or two only and they set the minimum amount of shares that can be bought. Which ordinary Fijians can find money to invest within two days unless he or she is well connected with the banks or has enough personal capital to take advantage of these offers? [quoted in 31].

The charges laid by the FICAC in 2008 focus on these process issues, in particular whether Qarase had acquired private interest in property he had a duty to administer (contrary to Section 109, a misdemeanour, punishable by up to 1 year in jail); and whether he had abused his office by failing to declare an interest in the purchase of shares for his own family company, or the allocation of shares to other companies who wanted to purchase them (contrary to Section 111 a felony, punishable by up to 3 years in jail) [24]. Lyle Cupit, who had been chairman of both institutions at the time of the share deal, told Pareti: 'What was done was clearly done in full disclosure and totally transparent and if the governance framework was in place it would have passed those deals' [quoted in 31]. However, FHL had sailed close to the regulatory wind the year before that interview when the national stock exchange temporarily suspended the company's licence because of a share transfer involving its founding managing director, Sitiveni Weleilakeba. Cupit refereed to 'indiscipline', and a 'family fight', promising that 'it won't happen again'. FHL's published reports for 2007 and 2008 declared that no director had an interest in companies with contracts with FHL while the appendix dealing with stock exchange listing noted Weleilakeba's Family Trust as an 'indirect interest' in FHL worth \$21,200 [14, 15].

With net assets of \$123 million in 2008, FHL could probably afford to pay the \$20 million back [14]. But in that case the two intermediaries, the FAB and the FTF would lose the dividend income paid to B shareholders. The indigenous institutions are free to invest this income relatively free of parliamentary oversight.

## The native land trust board

The NLTB is one of a network of Fijian-only institutions and government enterprises targeted in Bainimarama's clean-up campaign. It dates back to the 1940s, as an intermediary between Fijian landowners and non-Fijian lessees—then particularly in sugar. The NLTB acts as a trustee for Fijian owners, and has the exclusive right to deal in native land not set aside as 'reserves' for its owners own use (about 36% was reserved [38]). Leases need the approval of a majority of the members of the indigenous landowning group, the *mataqali*, and the NLTB distributes rents according to a formula that reflects and sustains chiefly structures of local authority, and also anticipates the dual structure of shareholding in FHL. The Fijian anthropologist, Rusiate Nayacakalou [29] describes how

The Land Trust legislation has not been readily accepted by the Fijians because they were apprehensive of allowing the control and administration of their land to pass to a public agency. It took two meetings of the Council of Chiefs, in 1936 and 1938, to secure their agreement. The apprehension has not subsided.

The NLTB is entitled to take up to 25% of the rent it collects to cover its administrative costs, with another 22.5% going directly to three levels of chiefs, with the remaining 52.5% distributed among ordinary members of the *mataqali*. The rents were set by law at 6% of the land's unimproved value, now well below current rates for freehold land [38]. The NLTB has difficulty managing on the 25% allotted to it and has had to go to the government for budgetary support. Lack of consultation, distribution and amount of rents provided a continual focus for popular Fijian suspicion and resentment.

A more particular issue has been the rents due to 'extinct *mataqali*' and un-owned land. The registration of the ownership of native land by *mataqali*, and the listing of the names of individual members goes back before the creation of the NLTB, to British colonial policy in the late nineteenth century. Some of these *mataqali* no longer having living members (Schedule A land) or the land was found to have no claimants when the land commission made its survey (Schedule B). Ownership of this land—and the rents from it—used to go to the government, but was assigned by Qarase's government to the NLTB in 2002.

The NLTB attracted the interest of the FICAC in two ways: over an information technology deal with a company called Connex, and over the NLTB's move into investment. Both were presented as forms of modernisation, but the latter was not entirely new. A Native Land Development Corporation had been set up in 1975, investing first in rural areas (a cane scheme and cattle projects) but moving into urban real estate development. In 2004, Prime Minister Qarase (who was also Minister for Fijian Affairs and hence chair of the NLTB) announced the creation of a Vanua Development Corporation (VDC). It would 'invest funds it receives from the NLTB to generate additional revenue for the board'. He particularly had in mind the '\$9-12 million' held at any particular time in a trust fund for landowners [20].

In 2007, the army began investigating the transfer of rents from A and B land to the Vanua Development Corporation. In June 2007 the interim government's Minister for Fijian Affairs announced that the VDC would be 'reexamined, with a view of doing away with it altogether'. FICAC called Qarase in for questioning on

the rents in May 2008. He explained that the funds ‘included money set aside for extinct *mataqali* and administered by the NLTB’ [18]. He was nevertheless charged by the FICAC with abuse of office, particularly that, ‘as Prime Minister and chair of the NLTB he had acted outside his powers by gazetting the NLTB Trust Fund Investment Regulations’ which enabled the NLTB ‘to enter into commercial investments and invest in the Vanua Development Corporation Limited’ [13].

### The institutionalisation of FICAC

The ‘Independence’ of an ICAC has at least three dimensions: from the Police, from other independent agencies, like the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and from the executive government. The FICAC is closer to the army than the police, though it hired former police investigators. Indeed one of its early targets was the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department who was charged with official corruption in 2007.

The Fiji constitution provides for an independent constitutional office of the DPP who is responsible for deciding whether or not cases should be brought to court. Fiji’s Penal Code explicitly provided that the DPP must approve the bringing of charges over corruption offences [26]. Lawyers for the defendants in several cases disputed the FICAC’s right to bring charges, and tried to get the High Court on their side. Amendments to the Penal Code were promised by the Interim Attorney General in 2007 that would reserve matters of ‘systematic and institutional corruption’ to the FICAC, and hand over ‘smaller matters’ (unspecified) to the Police. In June 2008, the High Court ruled that the FICAC should continue to investigate and prosecute, but needed to get the approval of the DPP before bringing cases to court [9].

No one yet fills the position of Commissioner who—with a reputation of their own to protect—might be able to stand up to government pressure. The FICAC depends on the government for its budget. Nevertheless Lt. Col Langman, a retired army officer who was appointed Deputy Commissioner in July 2007, has set about distancing the agency from the excesses of the ‘cleanup campaign’ and begun to assert his agency’s autonomy and claims to professionalism. He acknowledged that ‘there are innocent people whose names have been dragged in to some of the cases who have later been found innocent’ [12]. He was appointed on a 5 year contract. Staff members were recruited by advertisement and received training from experts from Malaysia and Hong Kong. Two staff members who had leaked information were dismissed. The investigation against Nadi Town Council was called off and the files taken were returned. The son of the Interim Finance Minister was charged with obstructing a FICAC investigation into the Sports Council [1]. He was acquitted, but the fact that the charge was brought is a sign of independence from the government. As the FICAC worked towards normalizing itself, Bainimarama [3] showed signs of impatience, complaining in September 2007 that he was ‘not satisfied’ with the speed at which it was working. But when the cases eventually came to court they were mostly the targets of his original campaign: board members of statutory bodies, public enterprises and of course the Prime Minister himself.

## What counts as ‘Corruption’?

Bainimarama has defined corruption in personal terms accusing the officials he deposed of ‘lack of moral strength or incompetence or abuse of power and privileges: Basically they were corrupt’ [11]. He has also criticised the systems in which it takes place. Social scientists have distinguished between several types of definition of corruption—legal, public office, public interest, market-centred, policy, and public opinion. A spokesman for the Fiji army introduced another term ‘management or leadership corruption’, pointing to failures to act against corruption once it had taken place. Then there is the idea of political corruption, or the idea that politics itself may be intrinsically corrupt. Each of these draws attention to a particular aspect of the Fiji anti-corruption campaign and politics more generally in Fiji.

### Corruption as illegality

The 2002 audit report identified multiple breaches of the Finance Act but only used the word ‘corruption’ once, murmuring ‘the possibilities of fraud and corruption can not be ruled out’ [18]. Fiji’s Penal Code lists a number of such offences: official corruption (section 106); extortion by public officers (section 107); having a private interest in property ‘of a special character’ that the officer has administrative or judicial responsibility for (section 109); making false claims (section 110); abuse of office (section 111), and so on [13]. There is also another set of offences dealing with ‘corrupt practices’ and ‘secret commissions’ (sections 375–379). FICAC is working within the existing penal code though the interim Attorney General has recently talked about introducing a new offence of ‘misconduct in public office’ reportedly because ‘it is wider in some respects than the statutory offence of Abuse of office, in that it is not necessary to prove any prejudice or detriment to the rights of another person’ [8].

### Corruption as a breach of the expectations of public officeholders

This definition focuses on the expectations of how an official should behave, and raises questions of whose expectations should count. These expectations may be formal (as in the legal definition) or informal. The standard definition of corruption as ‘the use of public office for private gain’ is of this kind. In this vein, the Audit Report [21] refers to public service values, and the failure of the Public Service Commission (PSC) to uphold them in this case. However we might have different expectations of politicians compared to public servants. The Fijian institutions are shot through with traditional expectations of how chiefs should behave. It is possible that we might have different expectations of people in different circumstances: as a banker and as a Prime Minister.

### Corruption as harmful to the public interest

The ‘public interest’ definition goes beyond concerns with legality or the expectations held about the behaviour of officials. It looks at the consequences of the action. Corruption, for example, is bad because it has bad consequences for economic growth or social solidarity. But it begs the question of who defines what is in the public

interest: politicians, civil servants, the army, or the courts? In the opportunity that the Audit Report gave him to reply to criticisms, the Permanent Secretary in the Agriculture Ministry defended his role in the scam in terms of public interest rather than legality. He mentioned the unworkability of the regulations, and the urgency of circumstances. He may have broken the rules, he implied, but he was acting as a public officer should in difficult circumstances, in the long term public interest [21].

### Market-centred corruption

This definition focuses on the way corrupt officials turn their offices into opportunities for profit. It reminds us that in Europe the ‘sale of office’ was a normal method of public administration, before the introduction of salaried officialdom and Weberian states. Positions could be bought and sold, and the incumbents lived of fees from their clients, rather than salaries paid for by universal taxation. We see its residue in ‘petty corruption’, wherein lowly paid officials routinely demand small payments for providing services that should be provided free.

A market-centred definition of corruption is related to the economists’ idea of ‘rent seeking’—hiding behind regulations to get more than you would in a freely competitive market—and to Robert Klitgaard’s targeting of monopolies in his famous formula:

$$\text{Corruption} = \text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability}$$

[25].

Bainimaramas’s focus has been on the deals among the Fiji elite which has been described as a ‘carousel’ of individuals jumping from company board to company board and trusted to ‘err on the side of their patrons’, who were the politicians who appointed them [22]. Bainmarama’s approach is market-centred in so far as he wants to remove special privileges that Fijian-only institutions had been granted, and so level the playing field. At the same time Qarase is being accused of practices such as borrowing to buy shares, and investing rental revenue that might be acceptable in the private sector. So Bainimarama wants to draw a clearer line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ ethics, following the second definition of corruption, above. We have also seen how FHL was forced by stock exchange regulations to become more forthcoming about its own internal operations, and to declare potential conflicts of interest among its directors and staff.

### Policy corruption

Actions might be entirely legal but nevertheless benefit particular leaders and their cronies. The idea of ‘policy corruption’ captures the persistent suspicion that the network of Fijian-only institutions benefited the indigenous chiefs who created them, and the particular allegation of insider trading in relation to FHL. The word ‘policy’ raises particular questions about the Agriculture Scam. The 2002 audit asked whether the Agriculture Scam was actually a ‘policy’, meaning an authorised, purposeful activity [32]. Had it been authorised by a Minister or Cabinet? (Evidence of Minister Tora’s approval could not be found, but the Cabinet approved it retrospectively just before the election). Had the funding been approved by



parliament in the budget? (It hadn't as the money was diverted from other programmes). Had it followed the financial guideline requiring farmers themselves to contribute one third of the cost? (They didn't). It also found other policy failures: 'lack of forecasting and planning, poor channels of communication and co-ordination and no means of performance monitoring and control'. It was hard to tell if any of the expenditure had got through to farmers, though Kunatubu—exercising his right of reply—listed examples of farmers' projects that had benefited from the distribution of plant materials (dalo suckers).

The Audit Report did not address the substantive rights or wrongs of the policy, or evaluate its consequences. It just asked just whether the policy had been authorized and implemented properly. It has been strongly criticised as a particular kind of 'Affirmative Action' policy (part of the broader 'Blueprint' originally presented by Qarase to the Great Council of Chiefs [34]). It was discriminatory against Indo-Fijians, inconsistent with free trade, and only befitted an indigenous elite [35]. In any case, the 1997 constitution provided for Affirmative Action on the basis of poverty rather than race [19]. It might also be criticised as a bad Agriculture policy simply to hand out tools to farmers.

### Public opinion

In this definition, 'corruption' is whatever people say it is. This type of definition may cast its net more widely, or more narrowly than other definitions. It may include personal as well as public morality—adultery as well as share dealings. But it matters as a test of other definitions in a democracy [39]. Lyle Cupit was alluding to this type of definition when he defended the FHL share dealings 'Those deals are clean' and 'its people's imagination that's getting them wrong' [quoted in 31]. A simple test of public opinion is elections and Qarase's government won a majority in two of those. However a 2006 survey of public opinion in Fiji just before the coup, summarised in Table 1, found that many people perceived various sectors of the government to be 'extremely corrupt'.

**Table 1** Perception of corruption and bribes paid by sector in Fiji

Sector	1	2	3
	% who perceived the sector as 'extremely corrupt'	% who paid a bribe (of those who had contact with the sector)	% who paid a bribe (worldwide average inc Fiji)
Tax revenue	25	3	3
Utilities	25	1	5
Registry and Permits	18	4	9
Police	22	7	17
Medical Services	20	2	6
Legal/Judiciary	19	5	8
Education system	19	1	5

Source: [36]

However perceptions (Column 1) were not strongly informed by experience (Column 2). Looking at Transparency International's corruption barometer, Claudio Abramo [2] found that 'perceptions are not good predictors for experiences', and vice versa. Reviewing 10 years of cross national comparisons, David Triesman [37] reaches similar conclusions. The link between perceptions and experience is particularly weaker in poorer countries like Fiji:

In the developed democracies of Europe and North America, reported bribery is rare and the corruption level is consistently perceived to be low. But among the countries perceived to have the highest corruption, there are some (eg Paraguay and the Camerons) where a large proportion of residents report paying bribes, whereas in others (for example Venezuela and Nicaragua) very few do so.

### Management or leadership corruption

There are two questions to ask about corruption: why it happens and why nothing is done to prevent it from happening again. The 2002 Audit Report detailed both kinds [21]. The individuals and organisations supposed to act against such misbehaviour failed to do so, or did so too slowly. The interim government did not authorise expenditure until it was well underway. The PSC failed to discipline the officials. The Commission of Enquiry cabinet agreed to in August did not happen (though the audit did). Police investigations faltered. Legal arguments frustrated prosecution. Part of Bainimarama's critique of Qarase, and the system of government more generally, was of the failure to act against the wrongdoing they (and everyone else in Fiji) knew was going on. According to a military spokesman:

People usually think corruption is centred on the exchange of money and that's why people like Qarase are asking for proof. The other facet of corruption, which takes time to prove, is what we are working on—that is management or leadership corruption. Corruption in government was so rife and they did nothing to address it [10].

### Political corruption

Critics of the Agriculture Scam saw it as a way of buying off the militants behind the 2000 coup, and ensuring the success of Qarase's pro-Fijian SDL in 2001 election [26]. A political scientist might argue: well, that's just politics. Bainimarama even described a public service pay deal a 'scam'. Some of his soldierly outrage, and the middle class professional support for the coup comes from a sense that politics in general had become, or perhaps was intrinsically, corrupt. This common sentiment fuels what has been called 'anti-politics': politicians who campaign against politics [23], rather in the way that Bainimarama claimed that his was the coup to end all coups. However this may be to take a rather grubby, instrumental view of politics. Political theorist Mark Philp argued that the word 'corruption' necessarily implies its opposite: the ideal situation that has become corrupt [33]. For royalists, this is a benign monarchy; for public servants it is the rule-following state; and for economists a freely competitive market. In Fiji there is one set of indigenous ideals

around chiefliness and ‘caring and sharing’, and another around immigrant ideals of equal citizenship and success on merit. Philp argued that we may legitimately disagree about such ideals, and hence that there will be inevitable legitimate disagreements about what counts as corruption, and whether something is corrupt or not [33]. His argument points to the principled basis of political disagreements in Fiji. The conflicts are not just about interests, but also about ideals.

## Conclusion

The army’s ‘cleanup campaign’ was widely criticised for acting in the absence of evidence. Now the army, though FICAC, has done what said it would eventually do: bring some cases to court. What the courts will decide (and how the interim government will react to those decisions) remains to be seen. So far only one non-Agriculture Scam case has been concluded: a former accounts clerk in a fisheries cooperative pleading guilty to a charge of ‘larceny by servant’ rather than corruption [4]. Qarase’s cases are still outstanding. Whatever the courts decide their focus on legality is unlikely satisfy people holding one or other of the broader conceptions of corruption outlined above.

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